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DUTY TO THE COURT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE  
SOME EXAMPLES, IMPLICATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS 
By Nigel Stobbs 
 
No liberal democracy can survive without popular trust in its judicial system. The legal 
profession and the judiciary enjoy a level of independence and autonomy from the executive 
that makes them both powerful and privileged.  
 
A UNIQUE AND ORGANIC DUTY 
So long as the courts are seen to fulfil their duty to guard against encroachments by the 
executive on the freedoms and rights of individual citizens with integrity and credibility, they 
maintain enough public support to retain their normative authority. But support for those with 
power and privilege is easily undermined. It is contingent upon trust. Lawyers who breach 
that trust in ways that go to the heart of the legal system ought to expect to be made 
examples of and to suffer severe penalties.  
 
The good news is that the sorts of breach discussed here should be neither difficult to 
anticipate nor to avoid – in theory. In practice, smart and honest lawyers sometimes fall foul 
of these duties for all sorts of understandable (if not condonable) reasons. Law does not get 
practised in a social or cultural vacuum. Lawyers are people, and people have weaknesses, 
failings and stresses. 
 
What is commonly referred to as the ‘duty to the court and to the administration of justice’ is 
actually a cluster of duties. They are of ancient heritage, but liable to change and expand at 
any time, by decree of the court. The general duty, long recognised at common law, is now 
entrenched in the relevant professional rules of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 
(ASCR) and associated instruments.1 It is relatively rare, however, to see clear or thorough 
statements of the various duties making up the more general duty or to find full agreement 
on when they have been breached. Justice David Ipp, writing extra-judicially, has classified 
the various duties comprising what we refer to as the ‘duty to court and to the administration 
of justice’ into four broad, but useful, categories: 
(a) a general duty of disclosure owed to the court; 
(b) a general duty not to abuse the court's process; 
(c) a general duty not to corrupt the administration of justice; and 
(d) a general duty to conduct cases efficiently and expeditiously.2 
 
What makes this cluster of duties special is that they are not a product of the fiduciary 
relationship between lawyer and client, not owed to any particular individual, and yet are 
ultimately for the public benefit. The duty arises out of the compact between the court and 
citizens, by which citizens surrender their right to personally pursue those who wrong them 
and the court promises to independently and impartially adjudicate disputes between citizens 
and between citizens and the state. This compact is at the heart of the rule of law. As agents 
(or officers) of the court, lawyers are individually and collectively responsible for the integrity 
of the system in which they work. This is a duty that has no equivalent in other professions.3 
It is individual and cannot be delegated.4 Neither ignorance of the nature and scope of the 
duty, nor inexperience as a lawyer will excuse a breach.5 The duty is, in fact, imposed by 
law6 (rather than arising from ethical principles), although breaches may well result in both 
legal and professional sanctions.7 
 
LAWYERS AS 'OFFICERS' OF THE COURT 
Lawyers are officers of all those courts that recognise their admission to practise. They only 
cease to become such officers when they die or when their name is removed from the roll in 
the court which admitted them.8 Most lawyers will readily assert and recognise that they owe 
a paramount duty to the court, and to the administration of justice, but not all have a clear 
idea of the nature and extent of that duty, or of the ways in which it can arise in practice. 
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They may have learned the mantra about a ‘paramount duty’ at law school and even be 
familiar with the legislation and rules that prescribe the duty,9 but this particular duty really 
requires lawyers to have a personal commitment to the reputation of the legal system. In 
short, it requires us to show some moral strength. 
 
Although the key elements of the duty are generally stable over time, the ways in which it 
can apply are organic and change in response to social and technological changes. For 
example, the potential to be perceived as engaging in disreputable conduct and bringing the 
profession into disrepute has become significantly greater with the advent of social media.10  
 
Some of the potential ethical issues that can arise are not always obvious. Nevertheless, 
most disciplinary proceedings for breaches of the duty owed to the court and the 
administration of justice don’t involve any subtle conflict at all. They tend to involve conduct 
which would probably strike a lay person as clearly dishonest or morally unacceptable. 
Either this isn’t always as obvious to the practitioner, or (more likely) an excess of zeal 
clouds their mind to the fact that their paramount duty may well require them to act in ways 
that are clearly to the detriment of their client. Another possibility is that, at a critical moment, 
they lack the moral strength to subjugate their own self-interest to the interests of the system 
in which they work. Whatever the explanation (or purported excuse) for such breaches, 
though, the High Court has reminded us in Gianarelli11 that the proper administration of 
justice requires the court to have complete faith in lawyers and their commitment to resolve 
any perceived conflict with other duties in favour of their duty to the court.12 
 
HONEST AND CANDID ADVERSARIES 
The commercial reality is that lawyers who achieve good outcomes for their clients get 
repeat business. Lawyers are (arguably at least) ethically required to be tenacious in 
defending and promoting their clients’ interests13 and sometimes to go to, what the lay 
person might think are extraordinary lengths to protect their clients' confidentiality. One 
expectation of officers of the court is that they act with frankness, candour and honesty in 
their dealings with the judiciary and other members of the profession. The temptation to 
'push the envelope' in pursuing the best outcome for the client, demonstrating what judges 
like to refer to as 'excessive zeal' can, however, derail this duty. 
 
In Mullins,14 the Queensland Legal Practice Tribunal considered the conduct of counsel 
acting for a client who sustained personal injuries (resulting in quadriplegia) as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident. Counsel provided the respondent insurer with a forensic 
accountant’s report prepared by Evidex, which assessed the client’s future earning capacity 
to age 65 years, but for the injury, at $934,178. He provided other Evidex reports that the 
client’s life expectancy was reduced by 20 per cent and that he would have continued to 
work in his trade as a builder until retirement. A mediation was arranged with counsel acting 
for the insurer. At this stage no court proceeding had been commenced, as the claim was 
progressing under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (MAIA). At a meeting of the 
plaintiff and his legal team held to settle a schedule of damages, a few days before the 
mediation, the client revealed to the lawyers that he had been diagnosed with cancer, 
including secondary cancers at various places in his body. Counsel’s preliminary view was 
that this diagnosis must be disclosed to the other side before the mediation, but the client 
was adamant that he did not want to disclose this information unless he was legally required 
to do. 
 
Counsel then prepared a written advice that the client wasn’t obliged at law to disclose the 
diagnosis within one month, and that he could still represent the client at the mediation 
provided they did not ‘positively mislead’ the insurer. The advice did not advise on how this 
reconciled with the fact that the other side had already been given a report stating that there 
was no impediment (unrelated to the accident) to the client’s life expectancy. 
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The Tribunal found that this conduct constituted professional misconduct, and ordered that 
the barrister be publicly reprimanded, pay a penalty of $20,000 and pay costs. The 
instructing solicitor was bound to act in accordance with paragraph 4.08 of the Solicitors 
Handbook15 which prescribed that ‘a practitioner shall not attempt to further the client’s case 
by unfair or dishonest means’. In disciplinary proceedings against the solicitor, he sought to 
mitigate his complicity in the impugned conduct by claiming that he was simply relying on the 
barrister's view.16 
 
The Tribunal acknowledged that an instructing solicitor could reasonably rely on counsel’s 
advice in some contexts, but the circumstances of this mediation clearly showed that the 
solicitor had not been merely a passive recipient of advice, but had brought his own legal 
knowledge, skill and experience to his consideration of it.17 The tone of the judgment 
indicated that the Tribunal found it somewhat mystifying that the lawyers could have believed 
their conduct, in knowingly allowing their colleagues to be misled, to be ethical. 
 
THE DUTY EXTENDS TO WORK BEYOND LITIGATION 
The Mullins matter also reminds us that the duty to the court and of honesty extends to 
professional work outside of litigation.18 Indeed, in our capacity as officers of the court it even 
extends to our conduct outside our professional lives.19 Legal practice is becoming 
increasingly diverse and the skills required of a lawyer are evolving and changing. What 
constitutes ‘legal work’ is sometimes a matter of opinion, and the question inevitably arises 
as to which of the many professional and commercial activities in which lawyers are involved 
are caught by the duty to the court.20 Justice Bryne in Mullins was concerned to emphasise 
the public perception and confidence dimension of the duty; that if a member of the public 
would think that the conduct was improper, whatever the nature of the work involved, then 
that needs to give pause to practitioners. In the case of mediations, one thorough analysis of 
the Mullins matter concludes that ‘currently in Australia, legal representatives owe exactly 
the same duties of honesty and candour in mediation as they owe in litigation before a court 
of law’.21 
 
Australian jurisdictions now allow for the incorporation of law firms and for multi-disciplinary 
partnerships, making the legal services market more complex and diverse. Yet when it 
comes to the tension between business and ethics, most of the ethical problems that come 
to the attention of the courts and disciplinary bodies still seem to involve fairly obvious 
breaches, related to obvious conflicts. Dishonest or improper conduct in the way in which 
practitioners do business with third parties can clearly be construed as breaches of duty to 
the administration of justice. If not dealt with in decisive and timely ways, the potential for the 
erosion of confidence in the profession and the legal system is significant.22 Practitioners are 
not expected to meet the same sort of fiduciary standard in business dealings with third 
parties as they do with their clients.23 However, dishonest or suspect business practices that 
fall short of actual fraud or misrepresentation can be just as damaging to the way in which 
the community views the legal system, and so the standards expected in those relationships 
is still high.24 
 
In Narayanasamy,25 a solicitor was found guilty of professional misconduct in that he failed 
to pay a third party debt in relation to payments for services (and a judgment debt) for 
property searches and inspections. In responding to the allegations, the solicitor drafted 
written pleadings and made oral submissions to the effect that he held the honest but 
mistaken belief that his clients were to pay the service provider directly. He also claimed that 
a disgruntled employee deliberately induced this mistaken belief by failing to include the third 
party’s invoice as a disbursement when issuing the firm’s tax invoices. Another self-serving 
assertion was that cheques which had been dishonoured when presented by the third party 
had been issued by an employee of the firm who had authority to operate the relevant 
account without reference to available funds. The Law Society had said that this suite of 
assertions ‘defies logic’ and the Tribunal's view was that ‘the bona fides of that defence is 
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questionable’. The Tribunal, in classifying this breach as professional misconduct, held that 
this level of misconduct fell squarely within the parameters of Allinson's case;26 namely, 
conduct which ‘would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful and dishonourable’ by 
‘professional brethren of good repute and competency’ in that the solicitor ‘has without 
reason or excuse failed or neglected to satisfy the debt’. He was publicly reprimanded and 
subject to a costs order. 
 
THE OBLIGATION TO ENSURE COSTS ARE REASONABLE AND PROPORTIONATE 
In 1994, a Victorian trial judge lamented that there had developed ‘an alarming culture at the 
Victorian Bar, which dictates to those afflicted with it, that there is no such thing as a case 
which is too long or too costly… no issue too small to be explored at excruciating length… 
and that concessions or admissions must never be made…’ His Honour predicted that ‘this 
culture will destroy our trial system sooner than later unless steps are taken to stop it’.27 
Referring to this and similar matters, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal declared: ‘Let it 
be understood henceforth, without qualification, that it is the responsibility of counsel to 
cooperate with the court and with each other…[to not overly prolong litigation].’28 The court 
added that the survival of the court itself was under threat and that although counsel was 
possessed of duty and privilege, neither of these would survive the death of the trial system. 
 
The Victorian Parliament enacted the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) to (in part) ‘cure 
unnecessary expenditure on litigation and the inappropriate use of the courts’ which the 
Attorney-General noted as ‘a matter that has been highlighted in several recent decisions’.29 
Ought we to be surprised that 16 years after those dire predictions of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, that this abuse of court processes was still a major concern? If the 'alarming culture' 
of over-servicing had not been remedied after all those years, perhaps this was because the 
sort of personal commitment to the reputation of the legal system, described above as being 
required of officers of the court, was not common enough. That is at least arguable in my 
view. 
 
This rather cynical view might explain why we are not particularly surprised to encounter 
continuing consternation expressed by the court, such as that in the recent matter of Yara 
Australia Pty Ltd v Oswal.30 
 
In Yara, the Victorian Court of Appeal refused an application for leave to appeal a decision in 
which a single judge had set aside the order of an Associate Justice for security for costs. 
The Court took the unusual step of 'requesting' the parties to address the question of 
whether in the conduct of the leave application there had been a breach by any party of its 
overarching obligation pursuant to s24(a) and (b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 to use 
reasonable endeavours to ensure that the costs incurred in the proceeding were reasonable 
and proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues and the sums in dispute.  
This request arose in the context of hearing of the application for leave to appeal being dealt 
with in a single day, with appearances by five senior counsel, six junior counsel and five 
firms of instructing solicitors representing the parties31 (the Court noting that at the security 
for costs hearings there had been a very similar level of representation). The Court also 
noted the fact that in addition to the notices of appeal and the parties’ written submissions, 
they had between them filed as their application books six lever arch folders of material. 
At [52] the Court noted that it was ‘burdened with excessive material' and that the applicants 
and the respondents were burdened with the costs of that material. The Court found that 
there had been a 'breach of the overarching obligation to ensure the costs are reasonable 
and proportionate by including in the application books voluminous material that was 
extraneous or repetitious and excessive.’ The court proclaimed its strong intention to ‘hold 
parties to account for undesirable civil litigation practices that are unfortunately too 
common.'32 
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CONCLUSION: LEX VITAE LEX AND ‘STUPID MOMENTS OF MADNESS’ 
Lex vitae lex refers to those laws that apply to people who choose a life in the law. Given the 
overarching public interest element that informs the duty to the court, lawyers are always 
going to be under greater public scrutiny than other professions. We have seen how factors 
such as ignorance, inexperience, excessive zeal and perhaps excessive self-interest can 
blind us to the paramountcy of our duty to the court. But those who depend on the law for a 
living need to be constantly aware that even a momentary lapse in judgement can have far-
reaching professional consequences. In Singh,33 a 56-year-old solicitor had practised as a 
lawyer in New Zealand, Fiji and Australia. The Queensland Law Society refused to renew his 
practising certificate in 2008 after discovering that he had been convicted in Fiji, in 2006, of 
attempting to pervert the course of justice, by attempting (on behalf of a client) to bribe a 
witness to change his evidence. He had initially resisted the criminal charge,34 but eventually 
changed his plea to guilty, asserting that he had acted in a 'stupid moment of madness'. He 
served a six-month sentence extramurally upon conviction. The Legal Services 
Commissioner took the view that he was therefore not a fit and proper person to practice, 
and succeeded in having him struck off.35 Singh variously argued that given his right to 
practice in Fiji had been renewed, that he had not reoffended or been subject to any other 
disciplinary proceedings, that a long period had elapsed since the original offence, and that 
he was continuing his legal studies, that striking off was an overly punitive response. If, 
indeed, he viewed his original transgression as a ‘stupid moment of madness’, then that 
moment had cost him dearly. But the potential erosion in public confidence in the profession, 
had he been allowed to continue in practice after such a ‘moment’, demonstrates the risk we 
take if we pursue a life in the law without making a requisite commitment to preserve the 
reputation of the court and of the profession. 
 
This article has been peer-reviewed in line with standard academic practice. 
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